Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Washington: What Does Alignment Cost?
Grace Notes in Context · History, Sovereignty & Power
Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Washington: What Does Alignment Cost?
A personal encounter with Cuba, a changing diplomatic position, and the questions Caribbean independence requires us to ask.
<
Havana Horizon, Washington Echoes. AI-generated editorial illustration for Grace Notes in Context; a symbolic composition, not a photograph of a shared location.
In my first post, I said I would examine Trinidad and Tobago’s vote against the United Nations resolution calling for an end to the US embargo on Cuba. The vote troubled me. But a reaction, however strongly felt, is the beginning of an inquiry.
To give my individual perspective credibility, I needed to examine the history, identify the people shaping the decisions, and distinguish what the evidence establishes from what I believe warrants further investigation.
I began with Cuba itself. Then I followed its relationship with the United States, Trinidad and Tobago’s earlier position, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s changing argument, Marco Rubio’s political interests and Dr. Neil Parsan’s diplomatic role.
Are we witnessing independent decisions in Trinidad and Tobago’s national interest—or a growing dependence that makes disagreement with Washington increasingly expensive?
Cuba is a neighbour, not an abstraction
Cuba is both Caribbean and Latin American. Its history begins with Indigenous peoples, followed by Spanish conquest, slavery and successive struggles over freedom, land and sovereignty. Its Caribbean setting and Latin American identity coexist. [1]
I also bring a personal encounter to this discussion.
I visited Cuba during the Obama opening—the period in which the United States and Cuba restored diplomatic relations on July 20, 2015. That date identifies the diplomatic milestone, rather than the precise date of my visit. [2]
I walked through Havana. I saw the architecture, the art, the culture and the ingenuity. An old DeSoto still running, with machinery that seemed assembled from a United Nations of spare parts! That image has stayed with me: resourcefulness keeping history on the road.
But I also saw racial distinctions and deeply deteriorated housing beyond the polished visitor experience. Those were my observations; one visit did not give me a complete account of Cuban society.
The beauty did not erase the hardship. The hardship did not erase the dignity.
Even the proximity gives me pause. Havana is just over an hour’s direct flight from Nassau, according to Bahamasair. Cuba belongs to our Caribbean neighbourhood, however distant political arguments sometimes make it seem. [3]
Before communism, there was a struggle over sovereignty
To understand the relationship, I had to ask more than, “Why does America oppose communism?” I also had to ask: How did Washington come to expect a decisive say in Cuba’s affairs?
American commercial influence preceded military occupation. In 1894, nearly 90 percent of Cuba’s exports went to the United States. Sugar and access to the American market tied Cuba’s economy to its powerful neighbour while Spain still held colonial authority. [4]
Cubans were already fighting for independence when the United States entered the war against Spain in 1898. Spain’s defeat ended its sovereignty over Cuba, but American occupation followed. [5]
Washington withdrew in 1902 after requiring Cuba to accept the Platt Amendment framework, permitting US intervention under stated conditions and restricting Cuban dealings with other powers. The National Archives describes the arrangement as virtually making Cuba a US protectorate. [6]
The formal intervention framework ended in 1934, although the Guantánamo naval-base arrangements remained. That legal change matters: American authority did not remain identical across the decades. [7]
Cuban suspicion of outside control therefore has a documented foundation. That does not prove that every later American concern was invented.
Revolution, pressure and the rights of Cubans
Batista’s 1952 coup interrupted Cuba’s constitutional order. The revolution that defeated him in 1959 arose against dictatorship. Opposition to Batista should not automatically be interpreted as consent to the system that followed. [8]
Washington initially recognised the new government. Relations deteriorated over reforms, nationalisation, American property and Cuba’s Soviet relationship. The failed CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and subsequent destabilisation efforts supplied concrete grounds for Cuban fears of intervention. Soviet alignment, in turn, heightened American security concerns. [2] [9]
An April 1960 State Department memorandum proposed economic hardship as a means of undermining Castro’s support. It documents an early coercive rationale; it does not establish an identical motive for every subsequent administration. [10]
Cuba’s 1961 literacy campaign belongs in this history. So do the 2019 Constitution’s declaration that socialism is irrevocable and its designation of the Communist Party as the leading force of society and the state. Social achievement and political freedom are separate measures of government. [11] [12]
A country’s right to resist foreign domination does not extinguish its citizens’ right to challenge their own government. Condemning repression does not, by itself, establish that an embargo is the right remedy.
What T&T asserted in 1972
On December 8, 1972, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica established diplomatic relations with Cuba.
These governments did not have to adopt Cuba’s political system to recognise its place in the region. Their action asserted independent Caribbean judgment. A contemporary American memorandum records Washington’s unsuccessful efforts to discourage the decision. [13]
That history supplies a benchmark for examining today’s government. Independence includes the right to cooperate with Washington. It also requires retaining the ability to disagree.
Kamla’s 2015 position—and the question of what changed
There is a revealing comparison within Persad-Bissessar’s own record.
In April 2015, she welcomed the Obama–Castro meeting, recalled T&T’s advocacy for ending Cuba’s isolation and the embargo, credited Eric Williams and successive administrations, and praised engagement. Her conclusion included the words “diplomacy works.” [14]
Obama likewise called on Congress to lift the embargo. Restoring diplomatic relations did not itself repeal it. [15]
In October 2026, her government opposed the UN resolution calling for an end to the embargo. Local reporting identifies this as a departure from T&T’s support in successive years following its initial 1992 abstention. [16]
A government can revise its judgment. But what changed in her assessment of engagement, and what evidence now supports economic pressure?
The stated principle—and the unanswered policy question
Persad-Bissessar defended the vote through democracy, human rights and Cubans’ right to elect their government. She expressly endorsed Rubio’s position on political reform. That is the government’s stated rationale and must be represented fairly. [17]
I hear the principle. My question concerns the instrument: How does maintaining the embargo deliver those freedoms, and who bears the cost while the promised transformation remains unrealised?
Opposition to the embargo is not automatically approval of Cuba’s government.
Regional reactions demonstrate different judgments. Barbados’ CARICOM Ambassador David Comissiong expressed disappointment with other regional positions. Barbados and six other CARICOM members supported the resolution; Jamaica, Guyana and Haiti abstained, while T&T opposed it. [18]
An abstention and an opposing vote are different choices. Each government must account for its own.
Marco Rubio: conviction, constituency and power
Rubio’s relationship to Cuba is political as well as personal. His parents emigrated in 1956, before Castro’s revolution, as Rubio stated at his confirmation hearing. They should not casually be described as having initially fled Castro. [19]
His major political turnaround concerns Trump: from rival in the 2016 presidential contest to supporter and secretary of state. His opposition to Cuba’s communist government has been comparatively consistent. His appointment gave him executive authority to pursue positions he had advocated before joining the administration. [20]
My political inference is that a transformation in Cuba could validate his longstanding pressure argument and appeal to anti-communist constituencies within his political base. That is a potential incentive, not proof that personal ambition overrides conviction. Cuban-American communities themselves should not be treated as politically uniform.
The question is what happens when a politician’s established convictions meet the authority of a powerful state—and neighbouring countries are asked to support the resulting policy.
What America wants includes economics
We should examine the whole agenda.
The administration’s June 2025 Cuba memorandum explicitly identifies US national-security and foreign-policy interests, private enterprise outside government control, restrictions on military-linked revenue and opposition to international efforts to remove the embargo. T&T’s vote can be compared directly with that published diplomatic objective. [21]
The economic objective is also written into law. Under the Helms-Burton framework, criteria for a qualifying democratically elected Cuban government include movement toward a market-oriented economy and progress on returning confiscated American property or providing compensation. [22]
Washington’s desired outcome therefore includes economic restructuring and property settlements as well as political rights.
A Cuba more open to private capital and less aligned with American adversaries could provide commercial and strategic benefits. These are reasonable inferences from stated objectives—not evidence of a concealed plan to acquire the country.
Democratic concerns and material interests can coexist. We do not have to ignore one to acknowledge the other.
Why Dr. Neil Parsan belongs in the examination
Parsan’s background spans veterinary medicine, university teaching, business and diplomacy. A contemporary 2011 profile described him as a loyal supporter of Persad-Bissessar’s People’s Partnership coalition when she appointed him ambassador to Washington. That establishes a political association, not a verified current UNC executive office. [23]
He subsequently held senior OAS responsibilities. Parsan Cross advertises commercial diplomacy, negotiation and advisory services, including work in energy. These are the firm’s stated services, not proof of his responsibility for a particular transaction or confirmation that every past business role continues today. [24] [25]
In August 2025, Persad-Bissessar’s administration appointed him permanent representative to the United Nations in New York. [26]
What advice did he offer on Cuba? What instructions did the mission receive? Who recommended the reversal?
His experience and political association justify these questions. I have not established that he designed the change, negotiated it with Rubio or secured a concession in return.
Venezuela and the leverage of energy permissions
On January 5, 2026, Parsan supported US-led cooperation against transnational crime while affirming constructive relations with Venezuela. Both parts belong in an accurate account. [27]
A February State Department readout subsequently acknowledged Persad-Bissessar’s support for US military operations in the southern Caribbean and identified energy and security cooperation as shared priorities. [28]
Energy is where unequal bargaining power becomes particularly concrete.
Development of Venezuelan gas projects has depended on American sanctions permissions. Revocation under Stuart Young’s administration in April 2025 and the later announcement of a Dragon licence in October 2025 demonstrate Washington’s ability to affect an important economic opportunity for T&T. These historical decisions do not establish the current licence terms. [29] [30]
This vulnerability crossed administrations. The present government inherited it and remains responsible for how it manages it.
It is reasonable to examine whether dependence on permissions encourages diplomatic accommodation. Establishing an exchange involving the Cuba vote requires additional evidence.
The data-centre question: whose resources, whose returns?
The July 2026 announcements proposed a 300-megawatt data-centre project involving Ernst & Young and third parties, and a 150-megawatt Hummingbird AI project with potential expansion to 500 megawatts. [31]
The advertised US$5 billion investment and more than 5,000 jobs covered three initiatives together, including steel redevelopment—not the data centres alone. They were prospective figures, subject to the projects advancing. [31]
The government presented the proposals as investment and diversification opportunities requiring further assessment. [32]
My concern is what T&T supplies to make those opportunities profitable: electricity, water, land, infrastructure and any concessions subsequently negotiated.
- What electricity prices apply, and who finances additional generation and grid capacity?
- What cooling system and water demand are proposed, and how is public supply protected?
- What land terms, tax concessions and state guarantees are involved?
- Who owns the projects, receives the returns and carries the financial risk?
- How many permanent local jobs, training places and procurement opportunities are secured?
- What regulatory, data-jurisdiction and termination rights does T&T retain?
The full agreements and supporting assessments are needed. Calling preliminary proposals an occupation would go beyond the evidence. Asking whether their terms could deepen dependence is justified.
How I have now structured my debate
I distinguish Cuba’s people from its government; sovereignty from endorsement of a political system; stated objectives from demonstrated results; and documented alignment from an unproven bargain.
My hypothesis is that dependence need not arrive through one explicit transaction. It can accumulate through energy permissions, security arrangements and investment commitments until each subsequent refusal becomes harder.
The alternative remains open: T&T could negotiate substantial benefits, protect public resources and retain independent judgment. The terms and subsequent conduct will determine which interpretation holds.
I cannot state that a “master nation” has dictated our choices. I can examine whether our government is accepting conditions that narrow them. Our leaders remain accountable, however powerful the country across the negotiating table.
What has been committed?
What is expected in return?
Who carries the risk?
And what freedom do we retain to say no?
That is where my first reaction has led me. Our history gives us reason to ask. Our independence gives us the responsibility.
Grace C. Walker
Grace Notes in Context
Observations, reflections, and lived perspective.
No Hype. Just Facts.
Endnotes & References
- Cuba’s Indigenous Caribbean setting. Library of Congress, Columbus and the Taíno . For colonial and independence history, see also Cuba in 1898 .
- Diplomatic chronology. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Cuba: Recognition, Diplomatic and Consular Relations . Records the occupation, diplomatic rupture and July 20, 2015 restoration of relations.
- Regional proximity. Bahamasair, Nassau–Havana . Describes Havana as just over an hour away. Flight schedules and operating times can change.
- Economic dependence before 1898. Library of Congress, Cuba in 1898 . Gives the 1894 export and import figures.
- The 1898 war. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, The Spanish-American War, 1898 .
- Conditional independence and intervention. US National Archives, Platt Amendment and 1903 treaty text .
- The 1934 change. US Department of State, historical treaty record, Treaty of Relations Between the United States and the Republic of Cuba, May 29, 1934 .
- Constitutional breakdown. International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the Rule of Law, 1962 , including its discussion of Batista’s 1952 coup.
- Invasion and destabilisation. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, The Bay of Pigs Invasion and Its Aftermath, April 1961–October 1962 .
- Early economic-coercion rationale. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Memorandum from Lester Mallory to Roy Rubottom, April 6, 1960 . An internal recommendation, not proof of an unchanged motive across all later administrations.
- Literacy campaign. UNESCO, Memory of the World, The National Literacy Campaign, Its International Legacy .
- Cuba’s political structure. Constitute Project, Cuba’s Constitution of 2019 , particularly Articles 4 and 5.
- The four Caribbean states and Cuba. US Department of State, archival memorandum, Commonwealth Caribbean Relations with Cuba, 1972 . Records US objections and notes the establishment of diplomatic relations on December 8, 1972.
- Persad-Bissessar’s earlier position. Newsday, April 12, 2015, PM Kamla: Cuba/US Meeting a Great Day .
- Obama’s engagement argument. Obama White House archive, April 11, 2015, Remarks at the First Plenary Session of the Summit of the Americas .
- The 2026 reversal. Trinidad Guardian, October 2026, T&T Votes with US Against Cuba Embargo Resolution . Used for the reported vote and T&T’s voting history.
- The Prime Minister’s stated rationale. TTT News, PM Persad-Bissessar Defends T&T’s Vote Against UN Resolution on Cuba . Reports her democracy argument and endorsement of Rubio’s position.
- Regional positions and reaction. Starcom Network, October 29, 2026, US Embargo on Cuba Resolution Vote Exposes Divisions in CARICOM .
- Rubio’s family chronology. US Senate confirmation hearing, January 2025, Nomination of Marco Rubio to Be Secretary of State . Rubio states that his parents arrived from Cuba on May 27, 1956.
- Rubio’s relationship with Trump and Cuba policy. Reuters, November 2024, republished by Investing.com, Trump Picks Former Rival Marco Rubio for Secretary of State .
- Published US policy objectives. White House, June 2025, National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 . Includes support for the embargo, opposition to international calls for its removal, private enterprise and US national-security interests.
- Economic and property conditions in US law. US Code, 22 USC §6066: Requirements for Determining a Democratically Elected Government . Particularly the market-economy and property-claim criteria.
- Parsan’s professional and political background. The Washington Diplomat, July 27, 2011, Couple of Natural Promoters for Trinidad and Tobago Get Down to Business . Describes his veterinary, teaching and business background and his support for the People’s Partnership coalition.
- Parsan’s OAS appointment. Organization of American States, September 21, 2015, New OAS Executive Secretary for Integral Development Confirmed by Development Body .
- Advisory services. Parsan Cross: Global Strategic Advisors . Firm self-description; not independent verification of specific clients, outcomes or current government mandates.
- Parsan’s UN appointment. Ministry of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, August 13, 2025, Dr. Neil Parsan Appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN .
- T&T’s Venezuela statement. Ministry of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, Statement Delivered by Ambassador Dr. Neil Parsan at the Security Council, January 5, 2026 .
- Security and energy cooperation. US Department of State readout, February 25, 2026, republished by PublicNow, Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar .
- Revocation of gas-project permissions. Newsday, April 8, 2025, Dragon Gas, Cocuina Licences Revoked .
- Subsequent Dragon licence announcement. Stabroek News, reproducing Trinidad Guardian reporting, October 10, 2025, Trinidad Gets OFAC Licence for Dragon Gas Field . Cited as a historical announcement, not confirmation of current licence conditions.
- Data-centre and steel proposals. TTT News, July 11, 2026, Government Signs Three MOUs for Potential US$5 Billion Investment . The investment and employment projections concern the three initiatives collectively.
- Government response to data-centre concerns. TTT News, July 13, 2026, Minister Dominic Smith Defends Proposed AI Data Centre Amid Public Concerns . Sets out the government’s preliminary-stage, feasibility and diversification arguments.
Well done! Extremely informative
ReplyDeleteThanks so much. I had to do a deep dive before I could post this.
Delete